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Abstract 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) rely on the cooperation of all 
participating  nodes  to  provide  the  fundamental  operations  such  as 
routing and data forwarding. However, due to the open structure and 
scarcely  available  battery-based  energy,  node  misbehaviors  may 
exist.[1]. One such routing misbehavior is that some selfish nodes will 
participate  in  the  route  discovery  and  maintenance  processes  but 
refuse to forward data packets. This paper pointed out Energy based 
selfish  nodes  (EBSN)  where  these  selfish  nodes  tend  to  use  the 
network  but  do  not  cooperate,  saving  battery  life  for  their  own 
communications [2],[3]. We present a simulation study of the effects of 
Energy based selfish nodes (EBSN) on DSR routing protocol and its 
impact over  network performance in terms of throughput and delay of 
a mobile ad hoc network where a defined percentage of nodes were 
misbehaving. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile hosts 
forming a temporary network without the aid of any established 
infrastructure  or  centralized  administration.  In  such  an 
environment, it may be necessary for one mobile host to enlist 
the aid of other hosts in forwarding a packet to its destination, 
due  to  the  limited  range  of  each  mobile  host’s  wireless 
transmissions. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) do not rely on 
any  fixed  infrastructure  but  communicate  in  a  self-organized 
way. 
Security  in  MANET  is  an  essential  component  for  basic 
network functions like packet forwarding and routing: network 
operation can be easily jeopardized if countermeasures are not 
embedded  into  basic  network  functions  at  the  early  stages  of 
their  design  [4].  Unlike  networks  using  dedicated  nodes  to 
support  basic  functions  like  packet  forwarding,  routing,  and 
network  management,  in  ad  hoc  networks  those  functions  are 
carried out by all available nodes. This very difference is at the 
core  of  the  security  problems  that  are  specific  to  ad  hoc 
networks. As opposed to dedicated nodes of a classical network, 
the nodes of an ad hoc network cannot be trusted for the correct 
execution of critical network functions. 
If  tamper-proof  hardware  and  strong  authentication 
infrastructure are not available, the reliability of basic functions 
like routing can be endangered by any node of an ad hoc network 
[5].  No  classical  security  mechanism  can  help  counter  a 
misbehaving node in this context. The correct operation of the 
network  requires  not  only  the  correct  execution  of  critical 
network functions by each participating node but it also requires 
that each node performs a fair share of the functions. The latter 
requirement seems to be a strong limitation for wireless mobile 
nodes whereby power saving is a major concern. The problem of 
all the current ad hoc routing protocols is that they trust all nodes 
and  assume  that  they  behave  properly;  therefore  they  are 
vulnerable to attacks launched by misbehaving nodes. According 
to [6], [7],[8] nodes misbehave because they are malfunctioning, 
selfish or malicious.  
Selfish nodes can agree to forward packets on behalf of other 
nodes  but  silently  drop  the  packets  in  attempt  to  save  their 
resources (energy and bandwidth). Malicious nodes may try to 
sabotage other nodes or even the whole network, for example 
one  malicious  node can advertise  itself  as having  the  shortest 
path  to  all  nodes  in  the  network  then  it  can  cause  Denial  of 
Service (DoS) by dropping all the received packets, in Black hole 
attack, or selectively dropping packets in Gray hole attack. Even 
more, malicious nodes can cause sever damage by collaborating 
in the attack, such as wormhole attack. Several ad hoc routing 
protocols attacks [9], [10] have been discussed in the literature. 
However, as far as we can say, there is not a deep study of the 
impact of such attacks on the performance of routing protocols 
through simulations. 
To  address  this  concern,  several  secure  routing  protocols 
have been proposed recently [11] [12] [13] [14]. Some of these 
protocols handle attacks by malicious nodes but not the energy 
based selfish nodes. At the best of our knowledge, there is no 
solution that  handles all  misbehaving  nodes actions. We  think 
that it is necessary to provide a simulation study that measures 
the impact of selfish nodes in order to provide protocol designers 
with  new  guidelines  that  help  in  the  design  of  fault  /  attack 
tolerant routing protocols for MANETs. 
In  this  paper,  we  give  a  simulation  study  of  energy  based 
selfish nodes impact on DSR [15], [16] performance. First of all, 
we present an overview of DSR in section 2. Then, in section 3, 
we give details on our Energy based selfish nodes (EBSN) model 
that include selfish behavior at routing level. In section 4, we 
describe  the  simulation  environment  and  methodology  in 
Qualnet v4.5. The simulation results were analyzed in Section 5 
and finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING (DSR) 
DSR is an on-demand, source routing protocol. Every packet 
has a route path consisting of the addresses of nodes that have 
agreed to participate in the routing of the packet. The protocol is 
referred to as “on-demand” because route paths are discovered at 
the time a source sends a packet to a destination for which the 
source  has  no  path.  The  DSR  routing  process  includes  two 
phases: the Route Discovery phase and the Route Maintenance 
phase. When a source node (S) wishes to communicate with a 
destination node (D) but does not know any path to D, it invokes 
the Route Discovery function. S initiates the route discovery by 
broadcasting a ROUTE REQUEST packet to its neighbors that  
contains the destination address D. The neighbors in turn append 
their own addresses to the ROUTE REQUEST packet and re
broadcast it. This process continues until a ROUTE REQUEST 
packet reaches D. D must now send a ROUTE REPLY packet to 
inform S of the discovered route. Since the ROUTE REQUEST 
packet that reaches D contains a path from S to D, D may chose 
to use the reverse path to send back the reply. The second main 
function of the DSR is Route Maintenance, which handles link 
outages. 
3.  TYPES OF SELFISH NODES 
Selfish nodes try to save their own resources since resources 
are very constrained in wireless devices. So selfish nodes may 
decide to not consume their resource in forwarding data packets 
for other nodes: this can be achieved in two ways [17]:
Semi  Selfish  Node  (SSN):  In  the  first  model,  the  node 
systematically does not perform the packet forwarding function 
which is disabled for all packets that have a source address or a 
destination  address  different  from  the  misbehaving  node. 
However,  a  selfish  node  that  operates  following  this  model 
participates  in  the  Route  Discovery  and  Route  Maintenance 
phases of the DSR protocol. 
The  Impact  of  the  Semi  Selfish  Node  (SSN): 
consequence of the proposed model in terms of consumed energy 
is that the SN will save a significant portion of its battery life 
neglecting  large  data  packets,  while  still  contributing  to  the 
network operation. 
Fully  Selfish  Node  (FSN):  The  second  model  focuses  on 
those nodes that do not participate to the Route Discovery phase 
of the DSR protocol. 
The Impact of the Fully Selfish Node (FSN): 
this model on the network operation is more significant than the 
first one. Indeed, if the node does not participate in the Route 
Discovery phase, then there will be no route including that node 
in  the  path:  the  consequence  is  that  the  packet  forwarding 
function will never be executed. A SN of this type uses the node 
energy only for its own communications. 
Energy Dependent Selfish Node (EDSN): In this proposed 
model, the node behavior follows the energy levels probed by the 
node.  We  propose  a  selfishness  model  that  uses
thresholds (Th1, Th2) to determine the node behavior. When the 
node’s available energy falls within the interval (E, T
behaves properly, executing both the packet forwarding and the 
routing function (E corresponds to the initial available energy of 
the node). When the energy level falls in the interval (
the node will behave as if it was a Semi Selfish Node (
disabling the packet forwarding functions. 
If the energy level is within the interval (T2, 0) then the sam
behavior as the one described for a Fully Selfish Node
selected. Whenever a node has no more energy it is possible to 
set a stochastic recharge phase: within a limited time interval the 
node’s  energy  is  set  back  to  the  initial  value.Therefore,  t
average  lifetime  (Lt)  of  the  node  can  be  defined  as  ratio  of 
Remaining  power  to  the  Power  consumption  rate.  Any 
cooperative node is assumed to turn  off its  packet forwarding 
function if its residual energy drops below 1/ Eth of initial energy 
so that it becomes selfish at time Tselfish as given below:
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Where  Eth  is  the  selfish  threshold  parameter  and 
average lifetime of the node. 
 
4. SIMULATIONS SET UP  
The  proposed  selfishness  model 
Network  Simulator  Qualnet  v  4.5  tool  [18],
simulation parameters are set as per Table
and  modules  at  physical  and  data  link  layers,  medium  access 
control protocols, and the ad hoc routing protocols we
compare DSR. The node movement scenario allows a node to 
choose its destination and moves towards it at a uniform speed. 
This is called the random waypoint model. When a node reaches 
its destination it waits for a pause time before choosing a 
destination and repeating the process.  Communications among 
randomly selected nodes are established using constant bit rate 
(CBR) traffic.  
Fig.1. Snapshot of High density network (60 nodes)
5. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The topology with 100 nodes is simulated with parameters 
such  as  initial  energy;  traffic  load  and  selfish
parameter  set  to  initial  values  and  their  performances  are 
recorded. Selfish threshold (Eth) is varied from 2 to 10; initial 
energy  is  set  to  1000  and  500  joules
compared.  Simulations  are  done  for  seven  different  random 
topologies  and  the  average  values  have  been  taken  for 
comparison. Fig. 2 portrays the comparison of packet delivery 
ratio (PDR)  with different parameter setting.  The consolidat
results show  that  higher initial energy is able to  deliver  more 
packets  compared  to  lower  initial  energy.  For  a  single  traffic 
load, as selfishness of the node increases, packet delivered by the 
network correspondingly decreases. 
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There is a heavy packet loss due to network congestion apart 
from our simulated packet drop due to selfishness. For example, 
at initial energy=1000, Eth =10, PDR is maintained more than 
99%  till  traffic  becomes  medium,  but  when  node  density 
increases to high, PDR comes down to 96%. Due to congestion, 
about 3% packet loss has occurred, though the environment (i.e. 
Eth =10) is more selfless.Fig.2.a shows the performance when the 
initial energy (Einitial) of the mobile nodes is set to 1000 joules 
whereas  Fig.  2.b  compares  the  performance  if  the  energy  is 
reduced to 500 joules. PDR drops to 20% on worst-case scenario, 
where Eth =2, initial energy (Einitial) is set to 500 units. 
The impact of selfishness on the average end-to-end delay is 
displayed  in  Fig.  3  under  different  initial  energy  conditions. 
Having the selfishness of nodes is set to low, the average end-to-
end delay increases till the number of nodes becomes 20 and then 
it starts decreasing. This is due to the fact that the packet loss is 
more after traffic load crosses the medium level of congestion. 
Also average end to end delay is defined as the average delay 
between the sending of data packet by the CBR source and its 
receipt by the corresponding receiver. This includes all delays 
caused  during  route  acquisition  and  buffering  at  intermediate 
nodes. 
Fig. 3.a shows the average end-to-end delay when the mobile 
nodes are less selfish whereas Fig. 3.b shows the delay when the 
nodes  are  highly  selfish.Fig.  4  shows  the  results  obtained 
simulating a MANET where the EBSN selfishness model was 
applied to all the nodes of the network pointed out that network 
performances  severely  degrade,  but  the  most  interesting  result 
has  been  depicted  in  Fig.  4.  The  last  family  of  simulations 
showed  an  interesting  characteristic  of  the  global  network 
throughput.  It  has  already  been  showed  [20]  that  the  global 
network throughput decreases when the node mobility increases: 
the reason is that link outage becomes more frequent causing a 
higher  packet  loss  probability.  On  the  other  side,  when  every 
node  of  the  network  is  selfish  of  EBSN,  simulation  results 
indicate that throughput increases when node mobility increases 
until  it  reaches  its  maximum,  then  it  decreases  when  node 
mobility  increases.  We  believe  that  this  particular  behavior 
depends on the mobile node topological position in the network.  
 
 
Fig.2.a: Packet delivery ratio for initial energy 
EInitial =1000units 
 
 
Fig. 2.b: Packet delivery ratio for initial energy 
Einitial = 500units 
 
Fig.2. Packet delivery ratio on initial energy, selfish threshold 
parameter and node density 
 
 
Fig. 3.a: Average end to end delay for selfish 
 threshold Eth =10 
 
 
Fig. 3.b: Average end to end delay for selfish threshold Eth = 2 
 Fig.3. Impact of selfishness on average end-to-end delay 
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Fig.4. Global Network Throughput vs Node Speed 
Given that the communication pattern used in the simulation 
produce a  dense traffic, a central node (i.e. a node that  has a 
central position in the MANET) consume more energy than a 
peripheral node because it acts as relays for other nodes, wasting 
its energy for routing and packet forwarding. When mobility is 
low, all nodes located in a central position stay in the central area 
of  the  network  and  consume  more  energy  than  peripheral 
nodes.Energy consumption leads to a selfish behavior: the packet 
forwarding  and  the  routing  functions  will  not  be  correctly 
executed and the network can be partitioned. As it is possible to 
see in Fig. 4 for a 1m/s speed, the global network throughput is 
drastically reduced. When node mobility increases, the location 
of a node changes from a central to a peripheral position and 
vice-versa  with  a  high  rate,  implying  that  the  energy 
consumption will be equally distributed among the nodes. The 
selfish  behavior  is  mitigated  and  throughput  increases 
considerably. However, when the node mobility reaches higher 
values the influence of the link outage over throughput is more 
important  than the  impact  of a  selfish  behavior:  speed affects 
negatively the network performance for speed higher than 13m/s. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Selfish  nodes  presence  is  one  major  security  threat  in 
MANETs  that  can  affect  the  performance  of  the  underlying 
protocols. In this paper, we have studied the selfish nodes impact 
on  MANET  performance  when  DSR routing protocol is used. 
Through simulations, we have seen how selfish nodes can affect 
network performance. From the investigations, it is found that 
model  is  able  to  regulate  the  selfishness  based  on  residual 
energy. With higher energy, the node is able to contribute more 
cooperation  and  as  well  as  more  packet  delivery  ratio.  It  is 
necessary  that  the security  scheme  adopted to face  the  selfish 
behavior  of a  node have to enforce the execution of both the 
packet forwarding and the DSR functions. Moreover, we believe 
that  a  selfish  behavior  that  selectively  disables  the  packet 
forwarding or the DSR function is not realistic: it is more likely 
that the node behavior  dynamically  changes  depending on the 
node’s  energy  level.  Therefore,  both  data  and  routing  packets 
need to be secured from selfish and malicious nodes. In future 
work, we will focus to develop a generic mechanism based on 
reputation to enforce cooperation among the nodes of a MANET 
and  to  prevent  passive  denial  of  service  attacks  due  to  node 
selfishness. 
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